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EUROPEAN POLICY CENTER Avrupa Politika Merkezi The European Policy Centre is reviving a tradition of publishing its New Year views on the current state of the Union, given the importance of the decisions taken at the December Copenhagen summit and the challenges facing the EU this year. What follows is not intended to be comprehensive and focuses on a limited number of internal and external policies. 2002 - a year which began with the smooth introduction of euro notes and coins and ended with the acceptance of 10 new Member States into the European Union - marked a significant milestone in the history of European integration. In spite of the many challenges facing the Union, 2003 should be a year to inspire confidence and optimism not least about the contribution an integrated Europe can make towards ensuring a peaceful, prosperous and democratic world. But it does not feel that way. The public mood is, inevitably, oversha-dowed by a possible war in the Middle East. There is discernible frustration that the European Union appears impotent when it comes to the major issues on the world agenda. There is also some nervousness that the United States, alone, appears to be the sole arbiter of our collective global destiny. Moreover there is an awareness that European integration has still failed to ignite the public imagination. The year 2003 offers many opportunities for further cons-truction or - destruction. The preoccupations facing the European Union include the state of both the European and the world economy, the threat of war, terro-rism, global poverty, social cohesion and the protection of our fragile world environment. Of course, at any one moment in time, public opinion may be an unreliable measure of what has been achieved by the EU and of the potential for the future. EU citizens do not appreciate the great progress the Union has made over the years. National politicians, in both present and future Member States, are still reluctant to take direct ownership and responsibility for what the Union says and does. Consequently little effort has been made to spell out to the public the immense benefits and advantages of the EU and of integration. The key challenges posed by the New Year are mostly self evident: -how to help ensure a peaceful world order based on the rule of law; -how to manage complex economic challenges posed by global deve-lopments and the creation of the euro; -how to ensure the success of the continuing process of EU enlargement; -how to ensure that an enlarging EU itself has the decision-making capacity and the democratic legitimacy to meet these and other challenges. Recommendations Constitutional Convention -The Convention must agree the text of a detailed Treaty by consensus. -The text must be developed throughout in a transparent manner. -The text must be approved by a short intergovernmental conference. -The key elements against which the success of the Convention should be judged are whether the results will ensure the effective operation of an enlarged Union; and the decisions on strengthening CFSP and economic governance. Enlargement -The Copenhagen decision was an important stage in the enlargement process but the EU, its Member States and the acceding countries, must not relax their efforts to prepare for the actual enlargement of the Union. -There needs to be a Europe-wide debate on the benefits of enlargement. -In particular, every care must be taken to ensure ratification by all 25 countries. Economic governance Improved economic perfor-mance will both enable the Union and its Member States better to carry out their plans to preserve and improve the operation of the "European social model". -The rhetoric of the "Lisbon process" must be matched by action and the March Brussels summit prepared with this in mind. Common foreign, security & defence policy -The EU should listen to public opinion and decide to forge a genuine common foreign, security & defence policy, ensuring that European policy towards international terrorism, Iraq and Palestine are not unilaterally decided in Washington. -The EU, under the Greek Presidency, should take an immediate initiative - in consultation with the UN and the US - to persuade the two communities in Cyprus to agree the United Nations settlement plan. -The EU - with the UN and preferably the US and Russia - should go beyond endorsing the "road map" and unequivocally state the peace terms it considers fair and reasonable for a lasting settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Constitutional Convention The architecture for a Constitutional Treaty, presented by the Praesidium on 28 October, has been broadly approved in plenary. Thus there will be one text with three parts; comprising the constitutional provisions, policies and final provisions, together with a few protocols. Remar-kably, a growing consensus can already be detected in the Convention, notably on the desire to produce a draft constitution for Europe and on a number of other issues including: -divising the constitutional and non-constitutional provisions; -integrating the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the new Treaty; -separating the legislative and non-legislative work of the Council; -strengthening subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments but without creating a second chamber; -reducing the number of decision-making instruments; -making more use of QMV; -strengthening CFSP and merging the Patten/Solana positions; -abolition of the Justice & Home Affairs pillar; -The election of future Presidents of the Commission through the European Parliament. There is consensus that the current system of the rotation of Presidencies of the Council has to be changed. It looks unlikely that consensus will be achieved on a long-term President of the European Council. There is a growing, but still limited body of opinion supporting the integration of the European Council and Commission Presidencies. So far - so reasonably good. But the Convention still has a long way to go. Convention President Valery Giscard d'ESTAING has shown sharp intelligence, decisive leadership and a sound tactical sense. However, he has also been justifiably criticized for not listening sufficiently to his members and for insufficient transparency, notably on the drafting of the framework Treaty. It is critically important that the draft articles of the first part of the Treaty and the first drafts of the second and third parts be presented to the Convention as soon as possible. For the first time in the history of European integration, there is a wide-ranging debate on the future shape of the European Union. However, so far it has been a debate in public, rather than the "public debate" envisaged by the Laeken Declaration. There is very little discussion within the Member States and even less among the acceding countries, even among the political elite. The issues of the greatest long-term importance are whether the resultant institutional structure will cope efficiently with a 25 state Union, and the extent to which CFSP will become integrated rather than intergovernmental. But the litmus test for the Convention will be the attitude of the Member States to its final recommendations. President Giscard d'ESTAING's strategy appears to have two prongs: first, that it is easier to achieve consensus over a detailed text than a series of individual recom-mendations; and second, that the Member States will have great difficulty in materially changing a detailed text agreed by consensus in a Convention that they set up. It is important that leaders of civil society publicly remind the national leaders of their responsibilities after the Convention has - hopefully - reached a consensus. Enlargement Agreement at the Copenhagen summit on the final terms of enlargement and the acceptance of 10 new members was an historic decision but, nevertheless, only a stage in the process. The EU, its Member States and the acceding countries, must not relax their efforts to prepare for the actual enlargement of the Union. In particular, every care must be taken to ensure ratification by all 25 countries. There needs to be a Europe-wide debate on the benefits of enlargement which, it is clear, hugely outweigh the costs of non-enlargement and the likely economic and political destabilisation of Central Europe. There also needs to be much more attention paid to the effect of enlargement on neighbouring countries. The process of enlargement will continue with countries in south eastern Europe -and elsewhere - poised to seek accession. But there must be a natural limit to the process of enlargement. The time has come for the EU institutions to begin a serious debate on "The Wider Europe", not least to define the character and extent of our future association with important neighbours to the east and the south. Economic governance The Lisbon European Council meeting in 2000 set the ambitious ten-year goal of making the EU "the most dynamic, competitive, sustainable knowledge-based economy, enjoying full employment and strengthened economic and social cohesion process". Unfortunately, this rhetoric has not been matched by implementation. The problems have long since been identified; it is solutions which are now required. Overcoming some of the problems takes a considerable time - such as improving education and training, which is vital to the project. However, some failures illustrate a lack of the political will needed to convert rhetoric into reality. A proposal for a Community patent has still not been agreed after many years. National protectionism has caused the reform of financial services to progress painfully slowly. The European Company Statute took 30 years to come to fruition. Small businesses are being stifled by cross-border complications. Labour market reforms proceed at a snail's pace. There is no consensus on tax harmonisation. The March European Council in Brussels will be a decisive moment for the Union to take stock of where it is falling behind in the reform process agreed in Lisbon. More to the point the Brussels summit must also agree on detailed decisions to put the reform process back on track. Meanwhile the capacity of the 12-strong euroland group of Member States to take effective action to confront the new economic challenges to growth and employment remains lamentable. Without the introduction of the euro the global economic slowdown would have had an even more serious impact on the EU economies. But we are a long way from having built an effective "economic pillar" to match the existing "monetary pillar" in support of the euro. It is urgent that the Convention emerges with a coherent strategy for economic governance including a stronger role for the Commission in monitoring and assuring compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact and increased decision making by ministers on a qualified majority vote basis. The Council, the Commission and the European Central Bank must also be vigilant in ensuring that the Pact is interpreted in the most effective way to meet the new economic challenges. Common foreign, security and defence policy There is a paradox in the inability of many political leaders in Member States to see further European integration as an electoral benefit. They tend to be most reticent about further integration in the one area in which the public fully under-stands the need for Europe to act and speak together: in forging a common foreign, security and defence policy. Public opinion strongly sup-ports Europe speaking with one voice yet the EU has yet to translate this public support into a strengthened CFSP and ESDP. The issue has become more urgent following the increasing divergence between American and European policies. George W. BUSH appears to have only two unequivocal major allies in his policy approach towards Iraq and international terrorism: Tony BLAIR and Ariel SHARON. Almost all other countries which may eventually support a US-led invasion of Iraq will do so reluctantly and under direct pressure from the Washington. Even the British public has not so far been enthusiastic in its support. There are increasing anti-American demonstrations in non-Muslim countries. The world is looking for leadership which will influence US policy: that leadership can only come from Europe. But, despite the valiant efforts of Javier SOLANA and Chris PATTEN, a continuing intergovernmental approach leaves national prime ministers and presidents free to operate unilaterally -even when opposing US unilateralism! Indeed several countries continue to compete in order to maintain what they perceive to be a "special relationship" with Washington. Were our citizens consulted on why a common foreign, security and defence policy is hardly developing, many would no doubt attribute the failure to the European Union. There is no reason for them to understand that the Member States insist on acting intergovernmentally in this policy area despite historical proof that the Community method works and intergovernmentalism does not. The evidence is clearly there, for example in the success of the European common commercial policy. When Commissioner Pascal LAMY acts on WTO issues, he does so with the full authority of the Union behind him with a policy mandate decided on the basis of a Qualified Majority Vote. In this sphere, the Union is the acknowledged equal partner of the United States. In the case of EU policy towards Iraq, there is too often a babble of voices representing Europe. Strengthening the CFSP institutional structure would not in itself lead to consensus on many issues, and certainly not on Iraq. A common commercial policy took years of patient development and political will - so far noticeably lacking in foreign policy. However, a continuation of the present institutional and decision-making system condemns forging a CFSP to failure. The ESDP fares no better. The Rapid Deployment Force of 60 000 troops, to be deployable within 60 days for a period of up to one year, is supposed to be in place by 2003 at the latest. The worthy objective is to enable the Union to carry out the "Petersberg tasks" of "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking". It is essential for the credibility of the EU that this timetable is met. At least the EU and NATO can now discuss how to cooperate and the EU taking over the police mission in Bosnia is an encouraging development. Outside the Balkans, the EU should take two initiatives -First, the Greek Presidency - in consultation with the UN and the US - should press the two communities in Cyprus to agree the United Nations settlement plan: there is a danger that, even were the Turkish Cypriots to agree to negotiate based on the UN proposals, the Greek Cypriots may believe that they need not, as a result of the Copenhagen decision to admit a divided island, accept the proposed plan. -Second, on the Middle East, the EU should go beyond endorsing the "road map" and unequivocally state the peace terms it considers fair and reasonable for a lasting settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. AB bu yıl ekonomide kendi ve dünyanın durumu, savaş tehditi, terörizm, küresel yoksulluk, toplumsal birlik ve hassas çevre sorunlarıyla uğraşacak. Yeni yılda AB gündeminde hukukun üstünlüğüne dayalı barışçıl bir dünya, Avronun oluşumunun yarattığı ekonomik sounlar ve genişleme sürecinin çözümlenmesi olacak. Önerilerimiz, yeni Konvansiyon tarafından Antlaşma metninin derhal kabul edilmesi, ekonomik yönetişimin güçlendirilmesi, genişlemede 25 ülkenin de onayının sağlanması, ortak dış politika ile güvenlik ve savunma politikasının geliştirilmesi ve kararların Washington'da tek taraflı olarak oluşturulmasının önlenmesi, Kıbrıs'ta ve Ortadoğu'da çözüm için BM ile birlikte etkin rol oynanmasıdır. Ancak güçlü bir Avrupa Birliği dünyanın beklentisini yerine getirerek ABD karşısında dengeleyici unsur olabileceğinden, süregelen güçlendirme çalışmalarının artık geciktirilmeden tamamlanması gerekir. |