PAT COX President of the European Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament Avrupa Parlamentosu Avrupa Liberal Demokratlar Baþkaný LIBERALIZM IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM I begin with two observations and with two small, but revealing statistics. The first observation is how many newborn boys today of Arab backgrounds are being named Osama. The second observation was made to me by a friend who had made a political visit some years ago to Egypt and who had remarked to me after the visit how he was struck at that time by the appetite for what I might call 'modernity' which manifested itself inter alia in a larger number of young urban women choosing not to wear a veil, even though that would have been part of the tradition of their parents. The same person recently made another visit to Egypt and was struck by the number of young women of independent economic means and substantial personal education who were making a personal choice to wear the veil. From neither of these observations, naming boys Osama or women choosing to wear the veil, do I draw some apocalyptic conclusions, but it is a measure nonetheless of a popular tendency and we ought to stand back and ask what this tendency means. Two statistics. I have seen a recent survey on feelings towards the United States in the Muslim and Arab world. In Turkey, a secular republic, a member of NATO, an ally of the West and of the United States and an EU candidate state, 83% are against the use of Turkish bases by US military in any attack on Iraq. In Egypt, the beneficiary of $2 bn aid per annum - although more of it much more military than civil - since 1979 and its peace treaty with Israel, only 6% expressed positive feelings towards the United States. Similar statistics were evident for Jordan and Pakistan. I mention both of those because they are both supposed to be allies of the United States. With those two observations and those two statistics I come to a first question. I don't know if Osama Bin Laden has ever read Huntingdon's Hypothesis about the clash of civilisations, but even if he didn't, there is a certain sense in which we know he could have written the book. He has managed to create through a highly strategic and focused act of terrorism a hyper-vulnerability in the world's only hyper-power. He has shown in terms of evil his capacity for being bad, but he has shown in terms of strategy his capacity for not being mad - bad but not mad. Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues in Al Qaida have managed to build for themselves a network of hatred based on alienation and on miscontent and discontent. We read various reports of the more extreme and fundamentalist Imam's in parts of the Middle East who preach about those who are non-believers as being the "grandsons of monkeys and pigs", but they have their counterparts in the West. Let me quote for you a statement made in October 2001 by a respected figure of the American right, Mr Franklin GRAHAM, the son of Mr Billy GRAHAM, the famous US evangelist. Mr Billy GRAHAM, was ill at the time of the inauguration of President BUSH and so his son, Franklin, deputised. In October 2001 some weeks after September 11 he said, and I quote, "we (referring to persons of his persuasion) are not attacking Islam but Islam attacked us. The God of Islam is not the same God" he said, "he is not the son of God of the Christian or Judeo-Christian faith, it is a different God and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion". Somewhere between the Imams, who see the unbelievers as the grandsons of monkeys and pigs, and Mr GRAHAM who seems hardly more sophisticated in the opposite direction, lies the challenge of liberalism - to escape from the anchors of conservatism in both communities. That is our politicians' challenge. Guided by those who wish to lead dialogue, guided by those who wish to build relations, we must play our part, because we will not find in either of those extremes among the fundamentalists of either community a solution to this question. Allied to the need to escape from conservatism in either community I add a second comment, as a convinced transatlanticist. I have a very strong belief in the value of and the necessity for strong transatlantic relations, and I am not in any sense anti-American. But, I do believe that Europe itself is challenged to give voice to Europe's all modern experience. It is an experience in respect of good gover-nance, of empowerment of citizens, of promoting progress with sustainable peace. Our history has within it seeds of a methodology that we must carry with conviction into trying to find solutions to conflicts and breakdowns in the world and, not least, in the context of Arab society, this debate that we are having about civilisation. I think the greatest cancer in the West's relationship with the Arab Islam space is the unsettled and unsettling question of the Middle East. There is absolutely no escaping the fact that the recruiting sergeant for Al Qaida is the alienation caused by the Palestinian question. As long as we fail to find a way to offer a perspective of peace in the Middle East we will leave the recruiting sergeants in place. If there is no perspective of peace, if there are no grounds for settlement, if the politics of the region are dominated only by the politics of the last atrocity, it is a misplaced presumption that security alone can deliver the answer. Over time we are offering a breeding ground for discontent and as you sow, you reap. My own conviction is that here again, although we have been trying with the United States, with Russia and the United Nations in the quartet to offer a perspective for peace, Europe must begin this year renewing and redoubling its focus and its effort in this regard. The Palestinian plight is central to the beginning of a disengagement of the discontent and from the drift towards a willingness to become a martyr, to offer oneself as a suicide bomber and to connect with radicalism. I do not believe that a US-led imperium in the region is the basis on which you will find a sustainable peace. When it comes to the promotion of governance, empowerment and oppor-tunity, I think these issues of so-called 'soft security' are the long-duration and harder issues to deal with and we have a special experience in Europe at dealing with the soft security questions. Bridge-building, cooperation agreements, reconciliation programmes, open dialogue, these are the methodologies that Europe has pioneered. We have got to be able on the basis of our European experience, to exploit and develop the soft security space as the mŽtier where we have a special experience and a very positive story to tell. I had the privilege in April 1999 with a number of colleagues to visit Auschwitz Birkenau with persons who survived that holocaust. Europe has drawn lessons from that period which still have a validity today in terms of institution building. We must not suppose that the ability to win a war, which the West can do, led by the United States, is synonymous with winning the peace. Winning the peace is the mŽtier and experience for which we, I think, as Europeans have a particular capacity. I add to that one other consideration. When King Abdullah of Jordan addressed our House last June he added one other ingredient of alienation in what he called the 'Arab street' - the fact that 50% of the population is aged under 18, many with no visible prospects or personal opportunity. If we do not create the circumstances for them to be stakeholders in society, we risk a drift towards nihilism and anarchy. Europe is philosophically, institutionally and politically better placed to give a lead for peace at this time. Let me turn to another related issue: the relationship between the EU and Turkey. I believe that the manner in which the European Union develops the politics of our dialogue and relationship with Turkey will be a very good concrete political test. Turkey is a state which, in terms of the religious preference and practice of its majority, is Islamic but which is secular in constitutional form. It is an ally with the West, with a constitutional order where there is still the need for more reform, with a human rights regime which we regard as inadequate, although there has been improvements, with a deep state which deeply worries people of a democratic disposition because we would like to see a greater weight for civil society, but with a willingness to reform, with a willingness to lead towards reform and with a willingness to engage. I believe that our relations with Turkey are a testing ground for many of the other more abstract and worthy concepts which we claim to support. If you can not treat with the willing, how can you begin to conceptualise in practical politics in dealing with the unwilling. For me, as a European Liberal, there is a liberal challenge and a European challenge to give concrete expression to a dialogue of the willing with Turkey. If the contract of the willing can not yield success how can we move from gilded words in safe environments in Europe into the actual hard political contracting needed in order to promote a process of democratisation, promotion of human rights, promotion of education and opportunity and empowerment of women in that region, as part of a package of values that we would see as indis-pensable to a sustainable peace. To summarise, if people want to call their sons Osama, that's their own business. If more women in Egypt want to wear the veil, that's also their own business. But, if the sum of the tendency is giving a signal, even in a modest way, of increasing discontent, as Europeans we ignore that discontent at our peril. That is our challenge in the beginning of the year 2003 to stand up for what we believe in politically, both as liberals and as Europeans, including as we look to Iraq in the next months. As we witness this extraordinary build-up of land, sea and air forces of amphibious forces and command structures accompanied by statements that war is not inevitable, I draw one inevitable conclusion: if you walk all these people up the hill and march them all down again, you certainly hand the victory to Saddam HUSSEIN. We risk arriving at a point where the sum of the parts, if they are not inevitable, have the mark of inevitability about them. I would like to pose the question, not about the dropping of the first bomb, if such an event happens, but about how you sustain the peace after the last bomb has been dropped? Answering that question is the overriding challenge for Europe today. EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN COPENHAGEN This is a very special Summit. The primary focus has been on enlargement, but this has not been a single issue Presidency. Together we have delivered a considerable amount in terms of legislation, with a dozen conciliations successfully completed, including on air safety and cosmetics. The Presidency has participated in 38 plenary debates and has worked with all our parliamentary committees. We have made a useful start and good progress in a dialogue on improving the quality of EU legislation. We agree with the target date of the Spring European Council. Our co-operation is continuing to deliver results. And we have other important business to conclude. The European Parliament would like this meeting to respond to the consequences of the major man-made disaster on the coasts of Galicia. We will accelerate our procedures to strengthen the Erika package. I wish through the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria AZNAR, to express our solidarity with the people of Galicia. But we need to show more than solidarity and sympathy. As one arm of the budgetary authority, we will respond with the utmost urgency to any proposals to provide practical financial support. Enlargement: I want to devote most of my remarks to the landmark issue of this Summit: Enlargement. I want to place on record our appreciation for the immense efforts of the Presidency, previous Presi-dencies which paved the way, and the Commission, and through them their services, in realising this great ambition and in preparing for this major event today. We in the Parliament have played our part. Now it is up to you. There are two dimensions to this last "sprint" and I will offer you the European Parliament pers-pective on both. On this date 21 years ago, General JARUZELSKI introduced martial law in Poland. This date, 13 December, should now take on a new meaning in Polish history, effacing a black day in its past. There is the remaining issue of the financing of enlargement, one of the trickier aspects of the complex of issues which you will undoubtedly unravel at this meeting. The European Parliament supports the efforts of the Danish Presidency to find a compromise. Of course, not everyone is happy with this compromise. Some Member States may feel that it goes too far; some Accession States, not far enough. I fully understand the legitimate and reasonable concerns of contributory Member States to minimise the impact on their own economy of the necessary commitments, at a difficult point in the economic cycle. At the same time, the Accession States have legitimate concerns too, in terms of minimising the fiscal shock of insufficient cash-flow and possible adverse impact on macro-economic development in the coming years. In some of the Accession States, we also note that public support for enlargement may be fragile. A break-through here should help to convince public opinion of the advantages of accession. Both sets of concerns need to be given due weight and the wisdom found for a balanced solution which is flexible, comfortably within the limits of the financial perspectives agreed in Berlin, and one which respects what has been described as the "historical imperative" of enlargement. Imperative may not be the right word. There is a choice. That choice is still open, but there is a moral-political contract which has already been entered into. On financing, we are not asking you to go the extra mile, but just a few more yards, if necessary. Cyprus: Secondly, this reconciling Europe should include a reconciling Cyprus. A conjuncture of circumstances has gifted us with a generational opportunity to find a settlement for Cyprus. Cyprus will be signing its Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003. The question is: will Cyprus be signing as a common State, representing all Cypriots? Ultimately, this is a question for the two communities and for the United Nations. We in the Parliament strongly support the efforts of Kofi ANNAN, and hope that even at this late stage the wisdom of a settlement will commend itself to all the political leaders on the island. The divided city of Nicosia is the last divided capital in Europe, a symbol of everything that should not be. In this regard, I ask to use all your moral suasion to invite the key players in the discussions which are proceeding in different part of this city to make a great breakthrough, so that, as almost all of the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community put it to me, no-one will be left behind in this Europe that we are building. Bulgaria and Romania: The European Parliament explicitly supports making 2007 the target date for the accession of the second wave countries of the fifth enlargement. Setting out a shared ambition for Bulgaria and Romania in no way removes the conditionality of acquis compliance, nor does it invalidate the principle of differentiation and own merits. What it does do, however, is to provide a focal point and a lever for mobilising the significant traction power needed to lift standards in legislative, implementation, administrative and judicial terms, to the level required. This is especially true of Romania where the recent Commission report made explicit reference to, and I quote, as I did to the joint chambers of the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest recently, "very serious corruption". Action by the Romanian Authorities is required to bolster and encourage the fight against corruption and to develop best practice for media freedom and political pluralism. Turkey: By a large majority (of 376 to 156, with 18 abstentions), Parliament voted for an open attitude, confirming the European vocation of Turkey while remaining prudent and necessarily conditional, and deciding not to pursue an alternative path which would deny membership and propose instead close partnership. This was heavy with significance. What Parliament was saying was that particular geographical or cultural conceptions of Europe would not constitute an obstacle to membership. What it says is that equality of treatment should be the basis on which we examine the application, but equality of treatment lays down obligations. Your decision to offer a definitive review in 2 years time demonstrates measurable and visible progress for Turkey's path going towards EU accession. By so doing, the European Council has shown the courage to support the new society in Turkey and the progressive, democratic and European agenda of the new government. Turkey should understand that this is a remarkable demonstration of a new phase in its relationship with the EU, in recognition of its efforts. This should be the message that should be broadcast by both ourselves and the Turkish leadership as the real result of this meeting. The work on this enlargement does not end today. A new challenge is now posed: explaining to our citizens what their political leaders have decided for them; earning their consent and support in a way that will show to citizens what is "in it" for them. Once the 'event' has passed, it will be time to make the process of enlargement work. It will also be a time when communication needs to be carefully managed, to avoid generating false hopes or scoring own-goals by disappointing expectations. Our public opinion needs to be re-engaged in this process; it is a huge job. The parliamentary perspective: For its part, the European Parliament will deliver by accelerating its work so that assent can be given to the accession treaties in good time for signature. We will, as one arm of the budgetary authority, deliver what is necessary, including on a "peace dividend" package for Cyprus, should you decide that a settlement could be shored up in this way. The European Parliament has agreed to welcome observers from the candidate States, in their adjusted Nice number, once the accession treaties have been signed. As to the interinstitutional consequences of enlargement, we share the view that an agreement between us is required to ensure a transparent but rapid parliamentary procedure for appointing 10 Commissioners from the accession States as from 1 May 2004. We would also be prepared to accept an advanced departure date for the current Commission, but no earlier than 1 November 2004. Participation in the Inter-Governmental Conference: We have concerns about the timetable of the Convention, already likely to outlive its one-year mandate by three months. We therefore believe that a draft should now be prepared and drawn up by the Convention Presidium as early as possible. This would avoid the confusion created by the submission of competing drafts of would-be constitutions, of variegated status, being circulated, and their rushed deliberation. On this, I would like to pose a question: can you confirm that the Convention will end by the Thessaloniki European Council, allowing that Summit meeting to draw up the agenda for the IGC? Without getting into the substance today, I would just make two general points. In the constitutional debates in the weeks to come, we must avoid getting locked into a debate which appears to the public as a 'corporatist' and inward-looking debate. Institutional "power-grabbing" and "corporatism" will ultimately give the Convention a bad name. People will just not understand why their down-to-earth and real concerns appear to be drowned out by quarrels over who should wear the Foreign Policy hat or who should be sitting at the top table. People will judge the outcome on a number of criteria: does it bring the EU closer to the citizens? Does it enhance parliamentary democracy in Europe? Does it give ownership of the process to the citizens? Does it strengthen our ability to get practical results for the benefit of people on issues they care about - jobs, safe food, a cleaner environment - and in a way in which the citizen feels he/she can influence the outcome? Institutional issues and reform of the Presidency: Reform goes beyond the issue of rotating Presidencies. In Parliament's view, the key reform is actually to ensure the maximum degree of transparency. The Danish Presidency has made important efforts but whenever you legislate, your proceedings at all stages should be in public, thus creating an unbroken chain of accountability when we decide on behalf of our citizens. When the Convention reports to the Inter-governmental Conference, I would like you to bear in mind the strong plea from the Presidents of Parliaments of the candidate States, that they be fully associated in the Conference from Day One. Whatever the precise, formal, legal situation at the end of the IGC's work, the Accession States have earned the right to participate actively and equally from the outset. Future EU Perspectives: A consequence of closure to the fifth enlargement and confirming the inclusiveness and irreversibility of Bulgaria and Romania's accession, without any new pre-conditions, will be to come face-to-face with the question of a political commitment holding out the prospect of membership to the countries of South-Eastern Europe in the West Balkans. It will be an early task of the Union to encourage the perspective of moving closer to the European Union and closer engagement. New neighbours: A second conse-quence, on which the General Affairs and External Relations Council has already drawn up some useful guidelines, will be the need for a New Neighbours initiative, one which can provide a helping hand for the new border countries after the accession of the "Laeken ten". Kaliningrad: On Kaliningrad, the Council is to be congratulated for the successful conclusion on the intricate question of transit agreed with the Russian government. I would make the point that the European Union should not rest on its laurels and instead build on the positive momentum in the relationship to make Kaliningrad the platform for a regional deepening of our engagement with Russia. Now that the visa issue has been settled, President PRODI's project from last year on regional development should be reactivated. Relations with Russia: Our relationship with Russia is a key one and will become even more important for the wider European Union. In our strengthened dialogue with President PUTIN, we should not hesitate in raising human rights issues, particularly the situation in Chechnya. This is the strong view which the leaders of the political groups have asked me to convey to you. Conclusion: This Union, the Union that today you will decide to enlarge and strengthen, is perhaps above all else about human rights and their promotion. We must never cease to assert the primacy of human rights in the world. HRISTÝYAN VE ÝSLAM DÜNYALARINDA LÝBERALÝZM Söze iki gözlemle ve iki kýsa ama anlamlý istatistikle gireyim. Ýlk gözlem: bugün Arap dünyasýnda yeni doðan bebeklere yaygýn olarak Usame adý veriliyor. Ýkinci gözlem bir arkadaþýmdan: Mýsýr'da bir süre önce genel olarak modernleþme isteði çok yaygýnken ve birçok genç kadýn peçesini çýkarýrken, bugün eðitimli, çalýþan kadýnlar bile peçe takmaya artan bir eðilim gösteriyormuþ. Ýstatistikler ise Ýslam dünyasýnda ABD'ye karþý duyulan tepki ile ilgili. Laik bir cumhuriyet olan, Batý'nýn ve ABD'nin müttefiki, NATO üyesi, AB aday üyesi Türkiye'de halkýn % 83'ü Irak'a saldýrý olursa, üslerin ABD kullanýmýna açýlmasýna karþý. 1979'dan bu yana her yýl iki milyar dolarlýk yardým alan Mýsýr'da ise ABD'ye karþý olumlu duygulara sahip insanlarýn oraný % 6. Her ikisi de ABD müttefiki olan Ürdün ve Pakistan'da da durum ayný. Þimdi bir soru soralým: Acaba Usame BIN LADIN Huntington'un "uygarlýklar çatýþmasý"na iliþkin kitabýný okudu mu? Okumadýysa bile bir bakýma kitabý kendisi yazabilirdi. Usame bin Ladin ve arkadaþlarý, bir að oluþturma baþarýsýný gösterebilmiþlerse bu, yabancýlaþma ve memnuniyetsizlik sayesinde olmuþtur. Ortadoðu'da, "kâfirler"in "maymun ve domuz soyundan geldiði"ni söyleyen imamlar olduðu basýnda yazýlýyor. Peki Batý'da da bu tür din adamlarý yok mu? Amerikan saðýnýn saygý gören bir temsilcisi, rahip Franklin GRAHAM, 11 Eylül'den birkaç hafta sonra Müslümanlar'ýn Allah'ýnýn Musevi-Hristiyan inancýnýn tanrýsýndan farklý olduðunu ve Ýslam'ýn "habis ve þeytansý" bir din olduðunu söylemedi mi? Bu imamlarýn ve rahip GRAHAM'ýn arasýnda bir noktada, liberalizme meydan okuyan bir sorun var: her iki dünyada da varolan muhafazakârlýktan uzak durmayý bilmek. Buna bir ikinci noktayý eklemek isterim. Ben hiçbir anlamda Amerikan karþýtý deðilim. Ama Avrupa'nýn bu alanda yapabileceði özel bir katký olduðuna inanýyorum. Avrupa'nýn modern çaðdaki deneyimi iyi yönetiþim, yurttaþlara güç kazandýrýlmasý ve sürdürülebilir barýþa dayalý ilerleme bakýmýndan çok önemli deðerler içeriyor. Batý'nýn Arap Ýslam dünyasý ile iliþkilerindeki en zararlý kanser, Filistin sorununun yarattýðý yabancýlaþmadýr. Ortadoðu'da barýþ saðlanamazsa, güvenlik önlemleri tek baþýna iþe yaramaz. Rüzgâr eken fýrtýna biçer. ABD, Rusya ve BM ile birlikte gösterdiðimiz çabanýn ötesinde, bu sorunun çözümü için AB olarak giriþimlerimizi yoðunlaþtýrmalýyýz. Bu bölgede ABD önderliðinde bir imparatorluk sorunu çözemez. "Yumuþak güvenlik" diye anýlan konularý, yönetiþim, güç kazandýrma ve fýrsatlar yaratma yönlerini Avrupa öne çýkarmalýdýr. Batý, savaþý kazanmayý biliyor; ama barýþý kazanmak ayrý bir iþtir. Arap dünyasýndaki gençlerin yoksulluk ve iþsizlikle boðuþmasýna da son vermek, onlarý sistemden çýkarý olan insanlar haline getirmek zorundayýz. Unutmayalým, Arap dünyasýnýn % 50'si 18 yaþýn altýndadýr. Bu konuyla ilgili bir baþka mesele AB-Türkiye iliþkileridir. Bu, AB için çok önemli bir testtir. Türkiye'nin halkýnýn çoðunluðu Müslüman'dýr, ama ülke anayasal sistemi bakýmýndan laiktir ve Batý'nýn müttefikidir. Ýnsan haklarý ve derin devletin yetkileri bakýmýndan sorunlarý vardýr, ama ilerleme ve reform niyeti de ortadadýr. Bence Türkiye ile iliþkilerimiz bir dizi soyut iddiamýz açýsýndan tam bir sýnav olacaktýr. Ýstekli olanla anlaþamazsanýz, istekli olmayanla ne yapacaksýnýz? Özetle, Ýslam dünyasýndaki memnuniyetsizliði görmezlikten gelmek bizim aleyhimize olur. Irak konusuna da bu ýþýk altýnda bakmalýyýz. Birlikler Ortadoðu'ya yýðýlýyor, ama savaþ kaçýnýlmaz deðildir deniyor. Benim görebildiðim þudur: Bu yýðýnaktan sonra geri çekilirseniz, zafer Saddam HÜSEYÝN'in olur. Önemli olan ilk bomba deðildir. Son bomba düþtükten sonra barýþýn nasýl kalýcý hale getiri-lebileceðidir. Bugün Avrupa'nýn karþýsýndaki mesele, bu soruya bir cevap bulabilmektir. KOPENHAG ZÝRVESÝ Bu zirvenin odak noktasý geniþleme olmakla birlikte, Danimarka'nýn Baþkanlýðý döneminde birçok baþka konu da gündemimizde oldu. Geniþleme Baþkanlýðýnýzýn, geçmiþ Baþkanlýklarýn ve Komisyon'un geniþleme konusundaki çabalarýný takdir ediyoruz. Biz de Parlamento olarak kendi rolümüzü oynadýk. Geniþlemenin finansmaný sorunu hâlâ çözümünü bulmuþ deðil. Avrupa Parlamentosu olarak, Danimarka Baþkanlýðý'nýn, üye ülkelerin finansmanýn yükünü azaltmak isteyen yaklaþýmlarýyla yeni üye ülkelerin hem ekonomilerini saðlam tutabilmek, hem de kamuoylarýný tatmin edebilmek için finansmanýn arttýrýlmasý talebi arasýnda bir uzlaþma arayýþýný destekliyoruz. Kýbrýs Ýkincisi, bu uzlaþmaya dayanan Avrupa, uzlaþmaya dayanan bir Kýbrýs'ý da içermeli. Kýbrýs'ta çözüm için kuþaklar boyu görülmemiþ bir fýrsat bir dizi koþulun bir araya gelmesiyle oluþtu. Kýbrýs Üyelik Antlaþmasý'ný 16 Nisan 2003'te imzalayacak. Mesele, Kýbrýs'ýn bu imzayý bütün Kýbrýslýlar'ý temsil eden bir ortak devlet olarak atýp atmayacaðý. Bu sorunun nihai cevabýný iki toplum ve Birleþmiþ Milletler'in arabuluculuðu verecek. Biz Parlamento olarak Kofi ANNAN'ýn çabalarýný gönülden destekliyor ve bu geç aþamada dahi adadaki önderliklerin bir çözüme ulaþmanýn bilgeliðini göstereceðini ümit ediyoruz. Lefkoþe, Avrupa'daki son bölünmüþ baþkenttir. Bu bakýmdan, müzakerelerdeki kilit oyuncularý, Kýbrýs Türk toplumunun hemen hemen bütün temsilcilerinin bana ifade ettiði gibi, inþa etmekte olduðumuz Avrupa'nýn dýþýnda kimsenin kalmamasý için büyük bir atýlým yapmaya davet etmenizi rica ediyoruz. Bulgaristan ve Romanya Avrupa Parlamentosu, beþinci geniþlemenin ikinci dalgasýna dahil ülkelerin üyeliði için 2007'nin hedef tarih olarak alýnmasýný açýkça desteklemektedir. Bulgaristan ve Romanya'nýn her ikisi için de bu hedefi gütmek, hiçbir biçimde müktesebata uyma koþulunu ortadan kaldýrmaz, ne de her bir ülkenin tek tek kendi geliþmesi çerçevesinde deðrlendirilmesi ilkesinden vazgeçmek anlamýna gelir. Özellikle Romanya'nýn son Komisyon raporunda iþaret edilen "çok ciddi yolsuzluk düzeyi" konusunda hassas olmasý gerekmektedir. Türkiye Bu konuda, Parlamento büyük bir çoðunlukla (376 lehte, 156 aleyhte, 18 çekimser), Türkiye'nin geleceðinin Avrupa'da olduðunu teyid eden ama ayný zamanda temkini elden býrakmayan ve kaçýnýlmaz olarak koþullar üzerinde duran, açýk bir tavýr benimsedi. Türkiye'ye üyeliði yadsýyan, bunun yerine yakýn bir ortaklýk öneren alternatif yolun izlenmemesi böylece kararlaþtýrýlmýþ oldu. Bu, anlamý büyük bir tutumdu. Parlamento, Avrupa konusundaki belirli coðrafi ya da kültürel anlayýþlarýn Türkiye'nin üyeliði önünde bir engel oluþturmayacaðýný söylemiþ oluyordu. Baþvurunun deðerlendirileceði temelin, farklý ülkelere yaklaþýmda eþitlik olduðunu ifade ediyordu. Ama yaklaþýmda eþitlik yükümlülükler de getirir. Sizin iki yýl içinde durumun nihai olarak gözden geçirilmesini teklif etme kararýnýz, Türkiye'nin AB üyeliðine giden yolda, ölçülebilir ve gözle görülebilir bir ilerlemeyi ortaya koymaktadýr. Bunu yapmakla, Konsey Türkiye'deki yeni toplumu ve yeni hükümetin ilerici, demokratik ve Avrupa yöneliþli programýný destekleme cesaretini göstermiþ olmaktadýr. Türkiye, bunun, kendisinin göstermiþ olduðu çabalarýn karþýlýðý olarak, AB ile iliþkisinde yeni bir aþamanýn çarpýcý bir göstergesi olduðunu anlamalýdýr.Hem bizim, hem de Türkiye'nin yöneticilerinin, bu toplantýnýn gerçek sonucu olarak yaymasý gereken mesaj bu olmalýdýr. Geniþlemeye iliþkin görevler burada sona ermiyor. Yurttaþlarýmýza bu kararý daha iyi anlatmamýz gereklidir. Parlamento'nun bakýþý Avrupa Parlamentosu üyelik antlaþmalarýnýn zamanýnda imzalanabilmesi için onay mekanizmasýný çalýþtýrmak amacýyla faaliyetlerini hýzlandýracaktýr. Bütçe konusundaki yetkilerimizi gerekli olan kaynaklarý saðlamak üzere kullanacaðýz. Buna, eðer siz çözümün böyle takviye edilebileceði yönünde bir karar alýrsanýz, Kýbrýs için bir "barýþýn ödülü" paketi de dahil edilecektir. Hükümetler arasý toplantýya katýlým Konvansiyon çalýþmalarýnýn takvimi konusunda kaygýlarýmýz var. Konvansiyon Prezidyumu'nun mümkün olduðu kadar erkenden bir taslak hazýrlamasý gerektiði kanýsýndayýz. Bu, birbiriyle yarýþ halinde bir dizi anayasa taslaðýnýn telaþ içinde deðerlendirilmesi zorunluluðunun önüne geçecektir. Bu çalýþmada halkýn anlayamayacaðý, bütünüyle kendi içimize dönük bir tartýþma tarzýndan ve iktidar mücadelesinden kaçýnmalýyýz. Halk sonucu, kendisini ilgilendiren konularda neler baþarýlmýþ olduðu temelinde deðerlendirecektir. Kurumsal konular ve Baþkanlýk konusunda reform Parlamento açýsýndan bu konudaki kilit reform saydamlýktýr. Bütün iþlemler halkýn gözü önünde yapýlmalýdýr. Yeni üye ülkeler hükümetler arasý toplantýya daha ilk gününden itibaren bütün haklarla katýlmak isteðindedir. Bu gerçekleþtirilmelidir. AB için geleceðin olasýlýklarý Beþinci geniþlemenin tamamlanmasýnýn ve Bulgaristan ile Romanya'nýn üyeliðinin hiçbir yeni koþul öne sürülmeksizin geri dönülmez olarak kabulünün bir sonucu, Güney Doðu Avrupa'da Batý Balkan ülkelerinin üyeliðinin gündeme gelmesi demektir. Rusya ile iliþkiler Rusya ile iliþkiler kilit önemdedir. Baþkan PUTÝN ile güçlendirilmiþ diyalogumuz esnasýnda, insan haklarý sorunlarýný, özellikle ‚eçenistan baðlamýnda, tartýþma masasýna getirmekten kaçýnmamalýyýz. Parlamento'daki gruplarýn liderlerinin size aktarmamý istedikleri bir görüþtür bu. Sonuç Avrupa Birliði, herþeyden önce insan haklarýnýn yaygýnlaþtýrýlmasýný hedefler. Dünyada insan haklarýnýn üstünlüðünü savunmaktan hiç vaz geçmemeliyiz.