LORD GEORGE ROBERTSON NATO Secretary General NATO Genel Sekreteri TOWARDS THE PRAGUE SUMMIT What is remarkable, though, is the timing of our Summits. In the forty years of the Cold War we had only 10 such meetings. In the decade since then, we already had five. So compared to the Cold War, the frequency of our Summits has doubled. In a way, this is hardly surprising. After all, the stately management of the Cold War did not require that much top-level guidance. The threat was static, and, hence, the Alliance was largely on "autopilot". After the Cold War, this changed. Summits had to give specific guidance, often in response to a rapidly evolving strategic environment. And our Summits delivered: London 1990, Rome 1991, Brussels 1994, Madrid 1997, and Washington 1999 all managed to move this Alliance forward. From a static Cold War Alliance, NATO turned into a dynamic agent of change. The Prague Summit will confirm this, yet again. However, in one important respect it will differ from its predecessors: The past NATO Summits were about incremental change. Prague is about NATO's comprehensive transformation.Why do we need to aim so high for Prague? Because 11 September 2001 caught the world unprepared. Until then, we had thought about terrorism largely as a domestic issue. After 11 September, we had to realise that terrorism has become an international security challenge. And that we had no real recipe to deal with it. And that was not the only shock we were dealt. The fact that Al Qaida operated from Afghanistan demonstrated the connection between terrorism and failed states. The fact that some of these terrorists were trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction raised yet another danger: the spectre of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in the hands of people too irrational to be deterred by the logic of orthodox deterrence. In short, 11 September has fundamentally altered our strategic environment. And it forces us to act. If we don't want future generations to label this era the "age of insecurity" or even "the age of terrorism", we must take the right decisions now. We must demonstrate that these new threats can be countered. And NATO will play a major role in helping us to counter them. Much has already been achieved. One key achievement was the invocation of Article 5. It offered solidarity to an Ally in need. It triggered a number of immediate, concrete measures. It created a powerful legitimiser for our countries to act decisively against Al Qaida and their Taliban hosts. But the invocation of Article 5 did much more. It extended our collective defence commitment to the scenario of a terrorist attack by a non-state actor. It turned combating terrorism into a new mission for this Alliance. And forced all of us to accelerate its political and military transformation. Another achievement of NATO since 11 September was to overcome the Alliance's long-standing "out-of-area syndrome". True, NATO as such did not play a direct role in "Enduring Freedom". But the immediate support given to the U.S., and the unquestioned deployment of European troops to Afghanistan sent a pretty clear signal: the idea of imposing geographical limitations on NATO's reach is, in effect, dead. To paraphrase one NATO Ambassador, when the World Trade Center collapsed, the notion of "in" and "out-of-area" collapsed with it. We can no longer look at threats only geographically. We must look at them functionally. Look at the Foreign Ministers communiquŽ from Reykjavik last summer if you want confirmation of that. Our third major achievement after September 11 was the breakthrough in the NATO-Russia relationship. NATO and Russia suddenly faced the same enemy. And Article 5, which Russia for decades had been looking upon with so much suspicion, was invoked in a way that had no anti-Russian connotation whatsoever. Both NATO and Russia seized the opportunity provided by this new strategic context. And you all know the result: A new spirit of cooperation, epitomised by the new NATO-Russia Council that we set up last May in Rome. So NATO began to change right after September 11. But much of that initial change was based on improvisation. We had to "paint a moving train", and that train was moving pretty fast indeed. And let's be frank: as much as we can be proud of our achievements to date, there have also been obvious shortcomings, particularly regarding our military capabilities. Many NATO members sent troops to Afghanistan, but for some Allies getting there and staying there proved to be embarrassingly difficult. We were simply not prepared for this kind of contingency. That is why Prague Summit is so important. It will give us the opportunity to make sure that, in future, we will be prepared. At Prague, the individual parts of NATO's transformation will come together to form a coherent whole. Prague will give us the chance to demonstrate that not only our security environment has changed, but that NATO has changed with it. Our Summit will deliver a forceful message: this Alliance remains as crucial to our safety and security today as it used to be in the past. I would like to offer some reflections on the bigger picture: What do the Prague decisions mean in strategic terms for our way ahead? First, a few words on terrorism. At Prague, NATO will unveil a major package of measures to combat terrorism. The individual parts of this package, like a new military concept, may not exactly set the pulse racing. But the strategic significance of this move can hardly be underestimated. It confirms that tackling terrorism is a core mission for NATO, not a one-off after September 11. It confirms that NATO is becoming a focal point for coordinating and planning the multinational military contribution to our defence against terrorism and other asymmetric threats. And it reinforces the message to the terrorists and to the regimes that host them: we do not bow to terror. We fight back. Second, weapons of mass destruction. At Prague, we will take decisions to broaden our range of tools to cope with this threat. Again, developing vaccine stockpiles or mobile detection labs are not the stuff of the headline news. But the strategic importance of these developments is beyond doubt. They signal that Allies are fostering a common transatlantic approach to deal with this challenge. There will be no divergence among Allies, no artificial separation of "soft" versus "hard" approaches, or whatever the notions some pundits have been tossing around. When it comes to coping with weapons of mass destruction, there will be just one approach - a NATO approach. Third, capabilities more broadly. You are all well aware that a centrepiece of the Prague Summit will be the clear-cut commitments of Allies to improve their military capabilities. What is the strategic importance of these commitments? First, and foremost, they will give NATO the right capabilities to tackle the challenges ahead: strategic airlift, air tankers, ground surveillance, precision guided weapons, protection against weapons of mass destruction; support for deployed operations and so on. All of this will help us to be prepared for the unexpected. But there is more. By beefing up our capabilities, we will also debunk the myth that has crept into the transatlantic relationship after "911" - the myth that the US and its Allies are no longer able or willing to cooperate as a military team. Prague will set the record straight. It will demonstrate that Europe and America are on the same wavelength; both mentally and militarily. The new NATO Response Force and modernisation of our command arrangements, including a new emphasis on transformation, will strongly reinforce this message. Fourth, enlargement. The NPA has contributed so much to this project that talking to you on the details would not just be boring, but outright insulting. So, once again, let us focus on the strategic significance of inviting new members. What does it mean? It means Europe's consolidation as a common security space, from the Baltics to the Balkans. It means that Europe is finally coming to grips with its own history, discharging much of its old excess baggage. It means that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe no longer need to look nervously over their shoulders. They can look forward, to the challenges ahead. And it means, quite selfishly, that we can spread the burden of security on more shoulders. Five, Partnership. What is the strategic value of Partnership, and of the enhancements we are going to make to these mechanisms at Prague? First, a true Euro-Atlantic security culture. A security culture based on concrete cooperation. A security culture that gives every country a stake in maintaining this continent's stability with mechanisms that enable each to make its own, specific contribution. Whether the issue is combating terrorism, joint crisis management, or security sector reform our Summit will demonstrate that the idea of a common security culture from Vancouver to Vladivostok is no longer a pipe dream, but a goal that lies within our grasp. And this security culture will not only extend along an East-West line. It will also grow to include our neighbours in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Next, Russia. We all know that there will be no grandiose NATO-Russia showcase initiative at the Summit. We don't need one. NATO-Russia relations were put on a new basis well before Prague. And I am glad to say that the efforts of the NPA and its President have helped tremendously to create the atmosphere of trust which made all of this possible. The strategic importance of sound NATO-Russia relations are clear. They mark the definitive end of a long era of confrontation and division. They mark Russia's transition from a disgruntled, resentful outsider into a real team player in the Euro-Atlantic community, trusting and trustworthy. But, above all, sound NATO-Russia relations enable us to deal far more effectively with the new challenges of today and tomorrow. If we are able to put Russia's enormous potential at the service of our common security interests, it would mean a quantum leap for the security of Europe, and indeed for global security. Six, the Balkans. At Prague, we will reaffirm our unflinching commitment to the stability of Southeast Europe. NATO's Balkan engagement has always had a strategic significance that went far beyond the humanitarian angle. Not only did we stop bloodshed and ethnic cleansing, we rallied the entire Euro-Atlantic community behind a common project: "de-Balkanising" the Balkans. We broke the fateful logic of great powers supporting their traditional client states in the Balkans. And we set this region on an irreversible course towards re-joining the European mainstream. This process, to which the NPA contributes through its unique parliamentary contacts, is far from complete. But it has made great strides. At Prague, we can note this progress with a sense of real achievement. Finally, a word on NATO-EU relations. You all know that, in a technical sense, this issue is not an agenda item at Prague. But it will be on our mental map nevertheless. Because NATO-EU relations are the missing piece in the puzzle of NATO's transformation. We all know the tremendous strategic value inherent in this relationship. We got a glimpse of it last year, when NATO and EU together prevented a civil war in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There clearly could be much more cooperation of this kind. More coherence in the policies of our institutions, and thus a broader set of instruments to deal with future challenges. And a better division of labour between our institutions, and thus fairer burden-sharing across the Atlantic. These strategic benefits are too important to be left in limbo. At or after Prague, and hopefully soon after Prague, we need to unlock the full potential of this relationship. But that picture would be incomplete without a word on the crucial role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO AFTER THE PRAGUE SUMMÝT Before September 11th, 2001, Prague was foreseen by all to be an "enlargement Summit". And to a great extent, it still was. A Wall Street Journal article said that, by inviting seven countries to start accession talks, "NATO has achieved the greatest victory in the five decades of its existence, by finally erasing the effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the Yalta Agreement, which had shackled Europe for half a century." Strong words. But it is certainly true that for the 19 current members of the Alliance, and for the seven countries invited to join, the Summit was another historic step in the true and voluntary unification of Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The prospect of NATO membership has helped to encourage, and to guide, the democratic reform process in all the aspirant countries, and to help settle outstanding disputes. Those achievements will be locked in when the seven invitees actually join our Alliance in Spring 2004. As Timothy GARTON-ASH said after the Prague Summit, Europe is rapidly becoming a place from which wars cannot start. NATO enlargement is helping to make that come true, in parallel with the EU's enlargement process. As you know, the EU holded a Summit meeting in Copenhagen in the past months where, among many other important decisions, invitations will be issued to 10 countries to join the European Union. This is another major step in creating a Europe whole and free. We should never underestimate that dual NATO-EU achievement Ð an achievement that simply reinforces the importance of strong relations between the two organisations. We all hope very much that Copenhagen unlocks some solid progress in that regard. Now, had September 11th never happened, my speech would have stopped here, which would have left rather of lot of time for questions. But it did happen. And it posed profound new challenges to the transatlantic community. September 11th forced Europe and North America to address three fundamental questions head-on. The first question was simple: a decade after the Cold War, and in the face of new threats, do Europe and North America still want to work together? Or, put less diplomatically Ð was the US about to walk away from Europe, and from NATO? The second question was equally simple: if Europe and North America still want to work together, what do they want to do together? And the third, to round it off: do they have, or can they develop, the capacities they need to work together and get the job done? These three questions were festering under the surface of the transatlantic relationship even before September 11th. The terrorist attacks ripped the lid off of the debate, and made it unavoidable. As we headed towards Prague, we were all aware that we needed the right answers to those questions, if the transatlantic security relationship was to remain healthy. In Prague, we got the answers we needed. First and foremost, the United States reconfirmed, in the clearest possible way, its commitment to Europe, to NATO, and to real transatlantic cooperation. In the months leading up to the Summit, there was a flurry of newspaper editorials suggesting that the United States had lost interest in NATO. Some pundits were certain that Europe was of no more security interest to the US. Others were sure that Washington no longer saw NATO as an effective fighting machine. Still others suggested that the US was promoting a robust round of enlargement simply to "complete" Europe politically, as a prelude to moving on and engaging in security relationships further afield. All of these so-called experts should take a close look at what happened in Prague. No Ally pushed harder for NATO reform than the United States. No country brought more ambitious ideas to the table. And no country laid out more concrete, realistic plans for how the Alliance, as a body, could improve its capabilities to take on new threats and challenges. Through this Summit, the United States put to rest any notion that it is walking away from NATO, or from Europe. Indeed, Prague demonstrated just the opposite Ð that Washington sees transatlantic security cooperation within NATO as a crucial element of American foreign policy. So Prague answered the first question facing the Alliance with a firm "yes". Yes, the US is still engaged in NATO Ð indeed, more so than ever. Prague also answered the second question this Alliance faced before the Summit: defining what Europe and North America wish to do together, in this new security environment. Prior to the Summit, the US focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction was seen by some in Europe as excessive, and to the detriment of other pressing needs. While in Washington, Europe seemed not to understand the gravity, and the immediacy, of the threat. In the months leading up to the Summit, the press was full of articles suggesting that Europe and North America simply had divergent strategic perspectives. Different, and potentially irreconcilable. Prague put an end to that debate as well. As Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, I guided the discussions which led to the Statement agreed by NATO's 19 Heads of State and Government. And I can tell you that when it came to defining the threats and challenges this Alliance faces, and the missions NATO should take on, there was no disagreement whatsoever. NATO's members all agreed completely that NATO must address head-on the threat posed by terrorism. Europe knows as well as North America that the new breed of terrorist considers all of our countries a potential target. The attacks in Bali, in Djerba, in Moscow, and now in Kenya only reinforce the fundamental truth that we are all at risk. In the past, we could assume that even terrorists were rational, political actors, susceptible to deterrence and with a strong interest in keeping their violence within some limits if they were to achieve their political ends. But the key feature of this new terrorism is the mass murder of civilians Ð which is why the NATO countries also agreed to cooperate on defence against weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaida left behind in Afghanistan documents, which proved their interest not only in acquiring "classic" WMD agents, but also in the "weaponisation" of diseases harvested from nature. That kind of threat only helped to unify transatlantic determination to take on this menace as well. Prague also put an end to transatlantic debate on the "out-of-area" question. Allies agreed that in facing new threats, artificial geographic limitations make no sense. They agreed that NATO should deter, disrupt, defend and protect against threats from wherever they come. And that our forces must be able to go wherever they are required to carry out their mission. In sum, at Prague, Europe and North America set out a common vision Ð of the threats we face, on how we should respond, and on where we might have to respond. It is a realistic and pragmatic vision, not of the past, but of our future. And in so doing, they answered any concerns about diverging strategic cultures. But of course, vision needs substance to back it up. And the third question we faced, going into Prague, related to precisely that: capabilities. Even if we agreed to continue to work together; and even if we agreed on a common vision of what we wished to do together Ð could the Alliance transform its capabilities to actually deliver on the full spectrum of Alliance missions? The Summit offered a very positive answer Ð but still only a partial one. It has been clear for years that NATO's military capabilities need to be radically restructured. Too many countries have heavy metal, Cold War forces that are unable to move quickly to where they are needed, and stay as long as necessary. Not enough have the high-tech capacities necessary to prevail quickly, and with minimum casualties. And one country Ð the US - is developing its capacities so quickly that a capability gap and a thinking gap threaten to make future transatlantic operations increasingly difficult to manage. September 11th made these problems impossible to avoid. Many NATO members had enormous difficulty even getting to Afghanistan in a timely way, and had to hitchhike with other countries or even think of taking the train. Others found they couldn't stay in Afghanistan for longer than six months, because they simply didn't have the sustainment capacity. And all recognised that only the United States had sufficient high-tech capabilities to achieve victory over the Taliban and Al-Qaida so effectively. It is unacceptable that our countries spend hundreds of billions of Euros on defence every year, but cannot deliver the military capabilities we need, when we need them. Over the years, various efforts to make improvements have been made, including within NATO. And they have delivered some results. But in the end, each initiative foundered on one of three shoals. Either the plan was unclear; or it did not have political support from the top; or it was deemed unaffordable. At Prague, we demonstrated that we had learned our lessons. NATO's 19 Heads of State and Government undertook to make major changes to Alliance capabilities. They approved a comprehensive package of measures at the Summit, all with one central aim Ð to ensure that NATO and especially its non-US Allies, can play an effective role in meeting new threats and challenges. And they took a dramatically different approach to making sure these improvements actually deliver. First, they made clear and precise commitments. Through what we call the Prague Capabilities Commitment, each and every NATO nation pledged to make specific improvements to the key military capabilities we need today, such as strategic air and sea lift, air refueling, and precision guided munitions. And these pledges came with specific timelines for development. Already, a first. Germany is playing a critical role in marshalling a multinational approach to our critical strategic airlift requirement. Heads of State and Government also approved the creation of a NATO Response Force. The NRF, as we call it, will bring together the best forces in the Alliance. It will give NATO the ability to move very quickly, to wherever needed, and hit hard, to prevent or respond to an attack. The NRF will also be a focal point for modernising NATO's interoperability. Which means that, when it's up and running in two years, it will fill a huge hole in equipping the Alliance to deal with new threats, whenever and wherever required. And like all improvements to NATO capabilities, it will complement the improvements taking place in the EU, including, of course, the EU's Headline Goal. NATO's leaders also gave their blessing to a military concept for defence against terrorism. The concept will give guidance to NATO's military planners on their preparations for deterring, disrupting, defending and protecting against terrorist attack. Heads of State and Government also endorsed the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives, including the creation of vaccine stockpiles and mobile detection laboratories. All of which means that NATO will now bring its unique assets to bear in tackling terrorism, as part of the comprehensive international response to this threat. At Prague, we also agreed to streamline NATO's military command arrangements to make them more flexible, and more useable for 21st century missions. And we have begun to radically streamline the way we do business inside NATO headquarters, so that we can arrive at decisions quickly, even as the Alliance enlarges. Taken together, these initiatives comprise a substantial, and substantive transformation of NATO's military capabilities. Prague set out a blueprint for improvements to the full range of NATO's capabilities. And this blueprint has a unique feature: it is both realistic and affordable. The initiatives agreed at Prague won't require vast new sums of money. Instead, they require that the vast sums of money already being spent on defence be better spent. NATO's nations are looking at innovative new ways of getting more bang for the defence Euro Ð role specialisation; pooling of assets; joint procurement. All sensible ideas. All practical. All doable. This is the great promise of the commitments made in Prague. But it is also a crucial challenge Ð and to be blunt, a challenge principally for Europe. If the European, and Canadian, Allies meet the commitments laid out in Prague, it will be a vivid demonstration of their determination to carry their fair share of the security burden. If they do not, it will be very difficult indeed to argue with those in Washington who continue to see their Allies as free-loaders in security. Which is why I intend to do my best to ensure that, when it comes to capabilities, the promise of Prague is met, and met fully. If September 11th ripped open a debate on NATO's future, Prague closed it. The Summit demonstrated clearly that transatlantic unity is as strong as ever. And it sealed in stone a fundamental transformation of the Alliance, which will endow NATO with the policies, the structures and the capabilities we need to tackle the new threats and challenges of the 21st century. In Prague, we got the right answers. Which is why, to my mind, the Summit will go down in the history books as one of the most important in NATO's history. "PRAG ZÝRVESÝNE DOÐRU" NATO zirvelerinin zamanlamasý çok önemli. Kýrk yýl süren Soðuk Savaþ döneminde bu tür toplantý sayýsý yalnýzca 10'dur. Soðuk Savaþtan bu yana geçen on yýllýk sürede ise beþ zirve toplantýsý yapýlmýþtýr. Bu aslýnda pek de þaþýrtýcý deðil. Soðuk Savaþ döneminde tehdit sabitti ve Ýttifak genellikle "otomatik pilot"ta idi. Soðuk Savaþtan sonra bu durum deðiþti. Zirve toplantýlarý hýzla geliþen stratejik ortama yön vermek durumunda oldu. 1990 Londra, 1991 Roma, 1994 Brüksel, 1997 Madrid ve 1999 Washington Zirveleri Ýttifak'ý ileriye taþýmayý baþardý. NATO, statik bir Soðuk Savaþ Ýttifakýndan dinamik bir deðiþim unsuruna dönüþtü. Önümüzdeki Prag Zirvesi de bu dönüþümü teyit edecektir. Ancak bu Zirve, diðerlerinden bir özelliði sebebiyle farklýdýr: Daha önceki NATO Zirveleri hýzla deðiþen dünya ile ilgiliyken, bu Zirve NATO'nun kapsamlý dönüþümü hakkýndadýr. 11 Eylül 2001 tarihi tüm dünyayý hazýrlýksýz yakalamýþtýr. O tarihe kadar terörü sadece ulusal bir mesele olarak deðerlendiriyorduk. Ancak 11 Eylül'den sonra, terörün uluslararasý bir güvenlik sorunu haline geldiðinin bilincine vardýk. 11 Eylül, stratejik konjonktürü temelden deðiþtirmiþtir. Gelecek nesillerin içinde yaþadýðýmýz çaðý "güvensizlik çaðý", hatta "terör çaðý" olarak adlandýrmalarýný istemiyorsak, doðru kararlarý þu anda almamýz gerekiyor. NATO bu yeni tehditlerle baþetmemizde çok önemli bir rol oynayacaktýr. NATO'nun 11 Eylül'den sonraki en önemli baþarýlarýndan biri 5. Madde'nin iþletilmiþ olmasýdýr. Bu sayede bir dizi acil, somut tedbir devreye sokulmuþ ve El Kaide ve Taliban'a karþý Müteffikler, güçlü bir meþruiyet zemini üzerinde kararlý bir þekilde mücadeleye giriþmiþtir. 11 Eylül'den sonra NATO'nun bir diðer baþarýsý da Ýttifak'ýn uzun zamandan beri süregelen "alan-dýþý sendromu"nu aþmýþ olmasýdýr. Ayrýca NATO-Rusya iliþkilerinde yeni bir devir baþlamýþtýr. Dolayýsýyla, 11 Eylül tarihinden sonra NATO deðiþmeye baþlamýþtýr. Ancak bu ilk deðiþim hamlesi önemli ölçüde doðaçlama bir þekilde olmuþtur. Biz hareket halindeki bir treni boyamaya çalýþýyoruz; üstelik çok süratle ilerleyen bir treni Ýþte bu yüzden Prag Zirvesi çok önemlidir. Prag Zirvesi, NATO'nun aslî görevinin terörle mücadele olduðunun teyididir. Terör odaklarýna ve terörü barýndýran ülkelere çok önemli bir mesaj verecektir bu Zirve: biz teröre boyun eðmiyoruz; terörle mücadele edeceðiz. Prag Zirvesi'nde ayrýca, kitle imha silâhlarý tehdidiyle mücadele konusunda da elimizdeki imkânlarý geniþletmeye yönelik kararlar alacaðýz. NATO Müteffiklerinin askerî yeteneklerini geliþtirme konusundaki kararlýlýklarý sayesinde karþýmýzdaki tehditle mücadele etmek için doðru imkânlara sahip olacaðýz. Bu þekilde beklenmeyen olaylara karþý hazýrlýklý olacaðýz. Ayrýca, Amerika ve Müteffiklerinin askerî konularda artýk iþbirliði içinde hareket etmedikleri söylentisine de bir son verilecek bu Zirve'de. Avrupa ve Amerika'nýn hem zihnen hem de asker” olarak ayný dalga boyunda olduklarýný göstereceðiz. Prag Zirvesi'nin bir baþka önemi de Geniþleme süreciyle ilgilidir. Avrupa'nýn Baltýk Denizi'nden Balkanlar'a kadar uzanan ortak bir güvenlik alaný haline dönüþmesi. Bu da Orta ve Doðu Avrupa ülkeleriyle beraber önümüzdeki tehditlerle mücadele edebileceðimiz ve güvenlik yükünü daha fazla omuza daðýtabileceðimiz anlamýna gelmektedir. Prag Zirvesi'nde ayrýca, gerçek bir Avrupa-Atlantik güvenlik kültürüne ve somut iþbirliðine dayalý Ortaklýk nosyonu da ele alýnacak. Bu güvenlik kültürü yalnýzca Doðu-Batý hattýnda uzanan bir kültür olmayacak, Güney ve Doðu Akdeniz bölgesindeki komþularýmýzý da kapsayacak. Bir de Rusya konusu var. NATO-Rusya iliþkileri Prag Zirvesi'nden çok önce yeni bir zemine oturmuþtu. Güçlü bir NATO-Rusya iliþkisinin stratejik önemi çok açýktýr: böyle bir iliþki, çok uzun bir çekiþme ve ayrýlýk devrinin sona ermesi demektir. Rusya'nýn düþ kýrýklýðýna uðramýþ, öfkeli bir yabancý olmaktan çýkarak Avrupa-Atlantik toplumunun güvenen ve güvenilir gerçek bir üyesi haline gelmesi demektir. Her þeyin ötesinde, NATO-Rusya iliþkilerinin güçlenmesi, Avrupa ve hatta dünya güvenliði açýsýndan büyük bir sýçrama yaratacaktýr. Ayrýca Balkanlar konusu da var. Prag Zirvesi'nde Güneydoðu Avrupa'nýn istikrarý konusundaki kararlýlýðýmýzý bir kez daha ortaya koyacaðýz. AB-NATO iliþkileri, Prag Zirvesi resmî gündeminde yer almamakla beraber zihnî gündemimizde. Zira NATO-AB iliþkileri, aslýnda, NATO'nun dönüþümünde bulmacanýn eksik parçasýný oluþturuyor. "PRAG ZÝRVESÝ'NDEN SONRA NATO" 11 Eylül 2001 tarihinden önce Prag Zirvesi herkes tarafýndan bir "Geniþleme Zirvesi" olarak deðerlendirilmekteydi. Ancak Ýttifak'ýn mevcut 19 üyesi ve 7 aday ülkenin katýlýmýyla Prag Zirvesi, Baltýk Denizi'nden Balkanlar'a kadar Avrupa'nýn gerçek anlamda ve gönüllü birleþmesi sürecinde tarih” bir adým olmuþtur. Timothy GARTON-ASH'in Prag Zirvesi'nden sonra belirttiði þekilde, Avrupa süratle artýk savaþlarýn çýkamayacaðý bir bölge haline geliyor. AB'yle paralel bir þekilde NATO'nun da geniþlemesi bu durumun gerçekleþmesine katkýda bulunuyor. Bilindiði üzere, önümüzdeki günlerde AB'nin de Kopenhag'da bir Zirve toplantýsý olacak ve bu Zirve'de pek çok diðer önemli kararýn yanýsýra 10 aday ülkeye AB'ye tam üyelik çaðrýsýnda bulunulacak. Bu da bütünleþmiþ ve hür bir Avrupa yaratmakta atýlan bir diðer büyük adým. NATO ve AB'nin bu çifte baþarýsýný hiçbir zaman gözardý etmemeliyiz. 11 Eylül Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika'nýn karþýsýna yepyeni tehditler çýkarmýþtýr. Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika artýk þu sorulara cevap vermek zorundadýr: Soðuk Savaþtan on yýl sonra ve yepyeni tehditler karþýsýnda Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika hâlâ birlikte mücadele etmek istiyor mu? Ya da daha az diplomatik bir ifadeyle, ABD NATO ve Avrupa'dan kopmak üzere midir? Bir diðer soru da þu: Eðer Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika h‰l‰ birlikte çalýþmak istiyorsa, birlikte ne yapmak istiyor? Üçüncü soru da þu: Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika birlikte çalýþmak için gerekli kabiliyetlere sahip mi, bu kabiliyetleri ortaya koyabilir, geliþtirebilir mi ve bu þekilde yapmak istedikleri þeyi gerçekleþtirebilir mi? Bu üç soru iþareti 11 Eylül tarihi öncesinde bile Kuzey Atlantik iliþkilerinde üstü örtülü bir þekilde zihinlerde mevcuttu. Terör saldýrýlarý kazanýn kapaðýnýn kaldýrdý ve bu sorularý ortaya çýkardý. Prag Zirvesi'nde birinci soruya net bir þekilde þu cevap verilmiþ oldu: Washington, Kuzey Atlantik'te güvenliðin temininde NATO þemsiyesi altýnda bir iþbirliðini Amerikan dýþ siyasetinin en önemli unsuru olarak deðerlendirmektedir. Evet, ABD hâlâ NATO'ya baðlý, hatta eskisinden çok daha fazla. Ýkinci sorunun yanýtý da geldi Prag Zirvesi'nde: Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika'nýn birlikte ne yapacaklarý. Zirve'den önce ABD'nin önemle terör ve kitle imha silâhlarý üzerinde durmasý Avrupa'da bazý çevrelerce aþýrý olarak deðerlendiriliyordu. Ancak 11 Eylül'de yaþananlar neticesinde, Prag Zirvesi'nde tüm NATO üyeleri NATO'nun doðrudan doðruya terör tehdidiyle mücadele etmesi konusunda mutabýk kaldýlar. Prag Zirvesi ayrýca, alan-dýþý tartýþmalarýna da bir nokta koydu. Müteffikler, yeni tehditler karþýsýnda yapay coðraf” sýnýrlarýn hiçbir anlamý olmadýðý konusunda görüþbirliðine vardýlar. NATO'nun kabiliyetleriyle ilgili üçüncü soruya gelince: her ne kadar birlikte çalýþmaya devam etmeye karar verdiysek ve ortak bir vizyonumuz varsa da acaba Ýttifak üstlendiði misyonu tam manâsýyla gerçekleþtirebilecek yetenekleri ortaya koyabilecek mi? Prag Zirvesi'nde bu soruya son derece olumlu bir cevap verildi ancak yine de bu soru kýsmen cevaplandýrýlmýþ oldu. NATO'nun asker” kabiliyetlerinin cidd” anlamda yenilenmesi gereði uzun yýllardan beri bilinmekteydi. Pek çok üye ülkenin elinde, gerek duyulan noktalara süratle iletilemeyecek ve buralarda gerektiði kadar tutulamayacak, Soðuk Savaþ döneminden kalma hantal birlikler var. Öte yandan Ýttifak'ýn bir üyesi, ABD ise kabiliyetlerini o denli süratli bir þekilde artýrýyor ki üye ülkeler arasýnda ortaya çýkan bu fizik” uçurum adeta bir zihinsel uçuruma da dönüþerek Atlantik'in iki yakasýnda gelecekte düzenlenebilecek operasyonlarý iyice zora sokacak bir tehdit halini alýyor. Prag Zirvesi'nde iþte bu duruma bir çözüm getirildi. Üye ülkeler askerî imkân ve kabiliyetlerini yenileyerek NATO'nun yeni tehditlerle mücadelesinde aktif bir rol üstlenme konusunda taahhütte bulundular. Devlet ve Hükümet Baþkanlarý ayrýca bir NATO Acil Müdahale Gücü oluþturulmasýný da onayladýlar. Bütün bunlar, NATO'nun asker” kabiliyetlerinin derin ve temel bir dönüþümü anlamýna gelmektedir. Prag'da kabul edilen bu inisiyatifler için büyük miktarda savunma harcamasýna gerek yok. Tam tersine, bu inisiyatifler, savunmaya zaten ayrýlan büyük miktarlarýn daha iyi harcanmasýný gerektirecektir. 11 Eylül eðer NATO'nun geleceðiyle ilgili bir tartýþma baþlatmýþsa, Prag Zirvesi bu tartýþmaya bir son vermiþtir. Zirve þunu ortaya koymuþtur ki Kuzey Atlantik birliði her zaman olduðu gibi güçlüdür. Prag'da sorularýmýza doðru cevaplarý aldýk. Ýþte bu yüzden bu Zirve tarih kitaplarýnda, NATO tarihinin en önemli Zirvelerinden biri olarak yerini alacaktýr.