FRANCK BIANCHERI Europe 2020 Direktörü, Prometheus Europe Başkanı Director Europe 2020, President Prometheus-Europe On Which Criteria to Judge The Success or Failure of the Nice Summit? The Nice Summit takes place at the turning point between two eras of the European construction. Yesterday, the people of the European Union wished to maintain their national exceptions; tomorrow they will no longer understand the absence of common rules. The whole dilemna to which national politicians and administrations are confronted in Nice, lies in the fact that they failed to anticipate this evolution. Today, with the fact that theEuro will be in the citizens' pocket in a year time (and not so much with the enlargementwhich calendar is not as immutable as that of the Euro), they have their backs to the wall. However, contrary to the habits taken since 1951, it is no longer possible to carry on postponing the big decisions; indeed from 2002 onward, with the Euro, some 300 million citizens will require accounts of all sorts and thus irrupt among the European political system. One should keep in mind that from then on, all national elections within Euroland will lay on European issues, suddenly become as central as is a currency in a market economy, affecting all the other sectors of society.Henceforth the true originality of the Nice Summit is not so much its content than its historic positionning a year before the Euro. It is the last great summit before the irruption of the peoples in the European game ; in otherwords, it the last summit where the " plumbers " can " peacefully " modify the " pipes and regulation systems ". Then everything will take place under the strong " pressure " of the peoples, events and whims of economic, social, political or cultural history. For better or for worse. Given this, how to estimate the success of this summit ? Let's start from a simple linking : 1 . For the last 10 years, the EU has related its fate to the success of the Euro, without any alternative or subsequent project. The failure of the Euro in the years that will follow its introduction in the citizens' pockets, would therefore mean the end of the European project (this case must be envisaged whatever may say the treaties which in the end only hide mens' incapacity to anticipate the future). 2 . An absolute priority must therefore consist to ensuring the success of the Euro ;this implies being able from 2002 to anticipate and react rapidly and efficiently to the political, social and economic consequences which will necessarily result from the major trauma inflicted to some 300 million people with a minimum preparation. This absolute priority therefore consists in endowing Euroland with the means of control/reaction to the internal consequences of the Euro. 3 . These means can easily be identified. They are called reinforced cooperation (of which the Euro is among the best illustrations, one should admit) or increased integration (extension of the fields of qualified majority). And they must be integrated as soon as possible to the European decision-maker's equipment, otherwise from the beginning of 2002 onward, the petrol and mad cow crises will appear as happy remembrances in the context of immense political and social instability that the Euro will catalyse (think of where, on a European scale, can be found the equivalent of our parties, unions, elections,political leaders who stabilize each of our national democracies that the Euro will all of a sudden considerably shrink). Without these tools, in two years time, it is a million people who will demonstrate against the EU in the streets of every European Summit, and the political forces mobilizing these crouds will not necessarily be democratic and/or pro-European. By enabling Euroland to make the Euro a success the European project will be endowed with an ability to confront successfully the coming decade and the challenge of enlargement. According to our analyses on the future of the EU, the Nice Summit will be a success if the decisions made there enable Euroland to better face the consequences of the Euro (social, fiscal, educational, commercial, structural). Otherwise the Summit will be a failure. And decisions will then have to be made in two years time under the pressure of the desorientated peoples. The essential responsibilityof the French Presidency in this matter (which deep down is a common matter of the 15and of their constant will in the last 10 years to postpone difficult decisions) consists ofmaking every present European decision-maker aware of the strategic nature of this Summit, the last great Summit before the arrival of the Euro in the citizens' pockets, and hence of the citizens in the Summits ! Enlargement, size of the Commission, balance of the votes_ are important issues,but in the end secundary with regards to the continuation of the European project. These issues inflame the " experts " but leave cold the peoples who will tomorrow lead the European dance while today they have no influence whatsoever (whatever may be the weighting or majority system). In 12 months time, the Euro will create all of a sudden a direct top-down link with each citizen; the capacity of the European system to resist, channel and respond to the strong resulting backlash, must clearly be reinforced. If the " remnants "of Maastricht can help, good ! But on the whole they offer rather minor technical tools. The only question that will appear in a year time will be: how to channel the peoples of Euroland within the European system? The European decision-makers should turn to thisquestion while approaching Nice; and forget Amsterdam which already belongs to a bygone era of European history. All our analyses in these last years are based on three ideas, rather simple ones in the end though reaching far beyond the more complex methodological tools: democratisation is a continuous process bringing the peoples closer to the places and forms of power by getting closer, the peoples are able to improve their vision, understanding andperception of power when the power does not anticipate and adapt its places and forms in the renewed opinion of the peoples, then the peoples realize that " the king is naked "_ and the king is dead ! In Nice, the challenge is to quickly sew a new dress for Queen Europe, rather thanbring her to the scaffold,_which is not only a French " tradition " ! FRANCK BIANCHERI: "NİCE ZİRVESİ'NİN BAŞARISINI YA DA BAŞARISIZLIĞINI HANGİ KRİTERLERE GÖRE BELİRLEMEK GEREK?" Euro'nun bir yıl içinde insanların cebine girmeye başlamasıyla, poitikacılar ve yöneticiler büyük bir sorunla karşı karşıya kalacaklar. 2002'den itibaren yaklaşık 300 milyon vatandaş muhtelif banka hesaplarıyla Avrupa siyasi sisteminin içinde yerini alacak. Bununla birlikte Avrupa ülkelerindeki ulusal seçimlerin kaderi de Avrupa'nın sorunlarına dayanmaya başlayacak. Nice Zirvesi, sıradan vatandaşlar Avrupa oyununa katılmadan önce gerçekleşecekson zirve, yani gerekli düzeltmelerin yapılabileceği son fırsat. Avrupa 10 yıldır başka alternatif planlamaksızın kaderini Euro'ya bağlamış bulunuyor. Euro'nun başarısızlığa uğraması Avrupa Projesi'nin sonu anlamına gelebileceği için euronun başarılı olması için gerekli önlemlerin alınması şarttır. Yaptığımız analizlere göre, Nice Zirvesi ancak burada alınan kararlar Avrupa Birliğiülkelerinin Euro'nun getireceği sosyal, mali, ticari ve yapısal sonuçlarla daha rahat yüzleşmesini sağlayacak nitelikte olursa başarılı sayılacaktır. Aksi takdirde, sonuç hüsran olacaktır. Bu konuda Fransa dönem başkanlığına düşen sorumluluk Avrupalı karar merciilerinin bu zirvenin stratejik öneminin bilincinde olmasını sağlamaktır. Nice Zirvesi'ne yaklaşırken, Avrupalı yöneticilerin Amsterdam'ı unutarak, insanları Avrupa sistemine nasıl yönlendirecekleri üzerinde durmaları gerekmektedir.